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CONSTITUION AND NARRATIVE IN THE AGE OF
CRISIS IN JAPANESE POLITICS
Keigo Komamura∗
Abstract:

The most significant political issue facing the legal world in Japan is

the drive for constitutional revision led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). This paper situates the revisionist movement within the context of
postwar Japanese politics before drawing on theoretical literature in critical legal studies to
analyze the LDP’s draft constituion to reveal the magnitude of the proposed changes and to
assess the risk they pose to the rule of law in Japan. The paper argues that the proposed draft
constitution eschews the languages of the current constitution like “a universal principle of
mankind”,

“individual”,

or “ fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free”, and forgoes

the basic legal rationality in favor of a mythical narrative of national essence, thereby
reducing law to the realm of politics and inhibiting the ability of the former to serve as a check
against the latter.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Shinzo Abe, current Prime Minister of Japan, arguably
achieved a political victory by passing contentious national security bills
in September 2015. This development looks like a historic turn for
constitutional politics in postwar Japan. From a practical point of view,
this apparent victory may be no more than an illusion. However, from a
legal and moral point of view, this change of direction may be seen as a
dangerous turn for constitutionalism.
With the new national security laws, the government expands its
military role, and in particular, asserts the right to collective
self-defense—something that consecutive cabinets have prohibited over
four decades based on a long-standing interpretation of Article 9 of the
Constitution of Japan.1 PM Abe has changed the basic constitutional
∗
Vice President, Keio University, Tokyo; Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Keio
University, Tokyo. I thank Mr. Adam Lyons, Ph.D. candidate, Harvard University, for his comments
on earlier drafts and for proofreading. Any faults in this essay are entirely my own.
1

The government has further expressed its official opinion to explain its interpretation about

the relationship between self-defense measures and the Constitution of Japan.

They often referred to

the right to individual self-defense, which article 9 of the Constitution allowed Japan to hold and use
under their interpretation.

As for the right to collective self-defense, the Cabinet clarified its position
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arrangement not by changing the text of Article 9 of the Constitution of
Japan (1946), but rather by changing his cabinet’s interpretation of the
text.
Many (actually almost all) constitutional law scholars in Japan see
this change of interpretation and the subsequent national security bills as
unconstitutional.2 Not just legal scholars, but also many professionals
including former judges of the Supreme Court of Japan, former directors
of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, political and social scientists, and
members of the opposition parties, and also a substantial number of
students and the youth—a considerable percentage of the
population—have cast doubts on PM Abe’s approach to constitutional
change.3 In Japan today we can hear critical voices from many sectors.
To overcome the people’s doubts and criticisms, PM Abe might
well have attempted to formally revise the Constitution by reforming the
text itself. This option might have been a royal road for PM Abe.
Formal constitutional reform might have swept away certain doubts and
criticisms of the reinterpretation tactic that has been perceived as
underhanded. There may even have been a public benefit if PM Abe
and his administration had attempted to formally revise article 9 through
constitutional change. I mean to say that the proposal for a formal
revision of the Constitution would lead to public awareness of the
fundamental nature of the proposed change.
It is generally said that throughout most of postwar period the
Japanese People have been keeping themselves distant from realistic
in 1972: Japan has collective self-defense right under international law, but cannot use it due to
constitutional restriction. See Government’s written answer submitted to the Audit Committee of the
House of Councilors, Oct. 14, 1972. In other words, as long as Japan is a state it naturally holds this
right, but it refrains from using it as a constitutional pre-commitment. This basic position had long been
maintained since 1972, but in July 2014, the current Cabinet with PM Abe changed the position and
made it possible for Japan to use the limited right to collective self-defense. See Cabinet Decision on
Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People
(National

Security

Committee

&

Cabinet

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf.

Decision,
For

the

July
Japanese

1,
version,

2014)
see

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei.pdf.
2
But the reason why the experts see this measure as unconstitutional varies. They actually are
not monolithic in reasoning, but concurrent in conclusion.
3
See, e.g., Linda Sieg & Teppei Kasai, SEALDs student group reinvigorates Japan’s anti-war
movement, THE JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/29/national/
politics-diplomacy/sealds-student-group-reinvigorates-japans-anti-war-protest-movement/#.WB8toi2L
Rdg.
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views on war and peace. In other words, as some critics suggest,
pacifist Japan has not been a “normal country” in regards to international
standards.4 To wake people from this postwar “daydream,” PM Abe
should have pushed for formal constitutional revision, thereby initiating a
change in public awareness of security issues.5 I am claiming that PM
Abe’s maneuver—simply changing the interpretation of the Constitution
without changing the text of the law—has in part served to cloud public
awareness of the magnitude of the constitutional transformation currently
in progress. This kind of subterfuge is not the higher politics that Japan
needs at this crucial moment. The risk of PM Abe’s strategy is that the
deep-seated attitudes and ignorance about the harsh realities of war and
security will not be changed at all so long as people stay in the postwar
daydream of Pax Americana.
Instead of such a self-righteous method as the interpretive change,
Abe should base his ambitious project of constitutional change on a true
deliberation subject to public oversight. This would be the only way to
realize the goal of transforming public awareness about the current
international security situation. PM Abe has opted instead for reckless
bravery, while leaving his own people in the dark about the kind of
fundamental changes he is trying to produce.
The time-consuming, but deeply meaningful, process of formal
constitutional change through public deliberation could have worked for
PM Abe. He could have actualized his original aim. In his memoir,
Toward a New Country, PM Abe explains what he means by the slogan
for his 2012 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) campaign: “Take Back
Japan.” He stated that this slogan does not mean merely taking back
Japan from the opposition DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan). He
concludes like this: “I dare to say it means taking back our country from
its own postwar history and delivering it to the hands of the Japanese
people.”6 His own personal political creed, “Break Away From the
Postwar Regime,” is a much more striking expression of his actual
position than is the LDP’s seemingly innocuous slogan. In public
4
For an explanation of “normal country” in the Japanese context, see Lionel Pierre Fatton, Is
DIPLOMAT
(Dec.
27,
2013),
Japan
Finally
A
Normal
Country?,
THE
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/is-japan-now-finally-a-normal-country/.
5
I have argued this position before. See Keigo Komamura, Anpo Hoan to “Kyu Jo no Wa”
[National Security Bills and “Circle of Article 9”], in YASUO HASEBE AND ATSUSHI SUGITA ED., ANPO
HOSEI NO NANI GA MONDAI KA? [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH NATIONAL SECURITY LAW?] 18, 27–29
(Iwanami shoten, 2015).
6
SHINZO ABE, ATARASHII KUNI E: UTSUKUSHII KUNI E (KANNZEN BAN) [TOWARD A NEW
COUNTRY: TOWARD A BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY (COMPLETE EDITION)] 254 (2013).
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debates, PM Abe emphasizes that he “would like to take significant steps
to reconsider this country by drafting a new constitution from a tabula
rasa with all the people.”7 It almost looks like he is proposing an
“Abexit” (!)— departure from the status quo of postwar Japan to some
more uncertain future.
In short, PM Abe feels a strong urge to erase or delete the history of
postwar Japan itself. The target of his ambitions is the Constitution of
Japan. By erasing the current Constitution on the grounds that it was
imposed by the U.S., he can simultaneously reshape the fundamental law
of the land and extinguish the uncomfortable history of the postwar
period. Thereby, PM Abe thinks he will be able to recover Japan’s
independence as a “normal country” and draw his own picture of a new
Japan on a blank canvas.
But what kind of picture would he like to draw? Some critics
claim it would be a picture designed to fit the ambitions that his own
grandfather, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, left unrealized.8 In
the 1950’s and early 1960’s, PM Kishi intended to take back true
independence from, or establish an equal relationship with, the U.S.9 I
do not go so far as to say that this is merely family business even if a
personal motive or an admiration for his own grandfather may possibly
provide PM Abe with some motivation for his public cause. The fact of
the matter is that independence (from the Allied Occupation or other
constraints) provides freedom to write any kind of constitution, and PM
Abe is not necessarily intending to reproduce the type of constitution that
might have suited his own grandfather, PM Kishi. The truth is that we
do not know exactly what kind of constitution we will end up with if PM
Abe gets his way. In fact, PM Abe has not explicitly stated which
specific constitutional changes will bring about the desired goal of
national independence, nor has he clarified how changing the
Constitution can be expected to bring about such a result.
We still have to ask PM Abe what picture he would like to draw on
the blank canvas of his constitution. In this short essay, I will examine
what PM Abe and the LDP would bring about for Japan’s postwar
7

ABE SHINZO TAIRONSHU: NIHON WO KATARU [A COLLECTION OF THE DEBATES BY SHINZO ABE:
SPEAK ON JAPAN] 78 (PHP ed., 2006).
8
Johnathan Soble, Shinzo Abe’s Bid to Redifine Japan and Its Military Has Echoes of Family
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2015),
History,
THE
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/asia/japan-military-shinzo-abe-family-history.html?_r=0.
9
As for PM Abe’s memories of his grandfather and his father, Shintaro Abe and his view on the
lost mission of the LDP, see ABE, supra note 6, at 25–42; ABE, supra note 7, at 38–41.
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constitutional project in place of the current Constitution of Japan. To
accomplish this goal, we should turn our concerns away from the issue of
the national security laws (2015) and look closely into their own
constitutional project, the LDP’s draft constitution (2012). Actually the
LDP’s draft constitution is not a proposal for partial revision. Their aim
is to replace the current Constitution with a totally new one.10 That
means the draft will introduce a dramatically different vision of Japan,
and, more importantly from a legal point of view, it will fundamentally
change the role of constitutional law. If the draft constitution were to be
realized, then constitutional law in Japan would undergo an irreversible
and dangerous transformation.
The central problem with the LDP’s draft can be understood as
follows. In the LDP’s draft constitution, narrative formations are
introduced and function to establish constitutional norms. As I will
argue
in
the
following
sections,
the
draft
codifies
narratives—myths—into the constitutional text. If the Constitution
maintains its basic nature as a legal code, it should be based on universal
principles, not contextual notions like narratives.
II.
NARRATIVE, CONSTITUTION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
A.

Constitution and Narrative

Constitutions are enacted at moments of truth for a country.
These can include revolutions, the achievement of independence, or
defeat in war. As the term constitution means a basic frame or structure
of government and society, the ‘moment of truth’ from which a
constitution is born is also a time to build or rebuild the nation or state.
Generally, “nation-building” or “nation-rebuilding” are terms closely
related to making constitution. Usually, nation-building refers to the
project of building a ‘nation-state.’ This means that would-be national
founders have to carry out a double task: they must build a state and also
define the terms of membership in that state. In order to define its
10

kenpô

For a comparative table of the current and the LDP’s draft constitutions, see Jiyumintô, Shin
sôan

[New

Draft

Constitution],

Oct.

28,

www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft].

2005,

at
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territory and membership and to establish democratic government based
upon national “borders,” the project of building the nation-state is always
inclined to assert that the identity of its people is a matter of nationalistic
bonds.
As Jürgen Habermas once stated, constitutional states are not
necessarily composed of purely legal concepts, and those legal concepts
sometimes have “conceptual gaps” through which naturalistic concepts
such as the people/nation may irrupt into the constitutional state.11 So,
nation-building projects leave open the possibility for a naturalistic
morality to be incorporated in the concept of a nation or a people. In
this context, national narratives widely shared among people are the most
relevant force for unifying a people into one nation. When a nation is
about to be built, narratives come in to fill in the “conceptual gaps” that
the constitution as a politico-legal document cannot cover.
In their co-authored book, Making We the People, an amazing work
of comparative study on the formation of the Constitutions of South
Korea and Japan, Professor Chaihark Hahm and Professor Sung Ho Kim
referred to the tension between the constitutions and their “unmasterable
pasts.”12 They see the past as “the primary material out of which a new
constitutional identity is forged,” and a new constitution sometimes
stands in judgment of the past, while at other times it may exalt the past.13
They state the claim like this: “More importantly, [a constitution]
reinterprets the past and tries to incorporate it into a new narrative about
the constitutional identity of the people” and “[I]n the process, the
constitution may even invoke an imaginary past that never was.”14 In
the process of making a new constitution, founders have to struggle with
the past―accepting, rejecting, selecting, and editing the past. So it is
quite natural that attempts to master the unmasterable past bring about
tension and highlight the inconsistencies regarding the legitimacy of a
new regime. To make up for such tension and inconsistency, nation
builders (or constitutional architects) form national narratives based upon
imaginary pasts and codify them into the text of the constitution. Hahm
and Kim seem to see the tension between constitutions and their
11

JÜRGEN HABERMAS, INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 115–16 (Ciaran
Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
12
See CHAIHARK HAHM & SUNG HO KIM, MAKING WE THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING IN POSTWAR JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 128–193 (Tom Ginsburg et al. eds.,
2015).
13
Id. at 128.
14
Id.
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They conclude as follows:

Whether for or against, the people’s engagement with the
past via constitutional founding and/or interpretation will be
beneficial to the extent that it yields a narrative about their
collective identity and common destiny. As a pole of
identity and contestation in the ongoing story of democratic
peoplehood, presence of the unmastered and unmasterable
past is essential to the making of a healthy and enduring
constitutional democracy.15
I share their image of constitutional founding as a political project,
however, as a legal scholar, I dare to point out some questions about this
image: Should the unmasterable past remain unmasterable throughout the
political life of a nation? Does the unmasterable past need to remain
open to interpretation and deliberation? If so, what guarantees our
ability to (re)interpret and debate about the past? The narrative
formation at issue here is both the most significant and the most
contentious function of constitutional founding as a political project.
But what happens to the founding of constitutional law as a legal project?
B.

Constitutional Law and Legal Principle
Needless to say, any constitutional founding is usually also the
founding of constitutional law at the same time. As I mentioned above,
a national narrative provides legitimacy and “collective identity” for a
political community. It presupposes a substantially homogeneous
society and sometimes, functions as a reason for the exclusion of people
who do not accept or share it. To the contrary, the law presupposes a
value-pluralistic society where people with different views, creeds, or
tastes live together somehow or other. In such a difficult society, the law
is granted special powers such as the normative power, or binding force
to justify or regulate governmental actions and people’s activities, and to
set up an order of justice.
We can see that there is a contrast between the function of mythical
narratives of identity and the functions of the law. The theory of
constitutional law and the rule-of-law tradition have long been premised
upon the law’s independence from politics and its predominance over
15

Id. at 196.
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politics. Given this arrangement, we can distinguish legal principles from
national narratives and elevate the priority of the former over the latter.
From this perspective, I will refer to a few problems of integrating the
unmasterable past into an official narrative.
First, the past is not a matter of facts alone. No matter how the
past, as a collection of facts, becomes integrated into narrative form, the
narrative will never obtain normative force. It is a sort of naturalistic
fallacy to think that facts bring about norms. When constitutional
constituents select a narrative version of the past, what they are accepting
or rejecting is not the past as a collection of facts. They are actually
opting to succeed to, or to reject, the principles upon which the past
regime was based. In fact, even Hahm and Kim, who make much of the
connection between narrative and multiple pasts, use expressions like “an
imaginary past,” or “the past as a source of legitimation in constitutional
founding”, and argue that “neither the past to be effaced nor the past to be
re-inscribed is an unmediated datum of fact.”16 Those expressions and
arguments might suggest that they share the goal of distinguishing a
narrative version of the past from some notion of the totality of all
possibly relevant historical facts, and that they thereby acknowledge the
role of a counterfactual imagination through which a past gets
well-ordered. 17 What inspires such a counterfactual imagination?
What makes the past well-ordered? I suggest that the notion of legal
principle provides a possible answer from the perspective of the law.18
Second, as for the Constitution as a nation-building project,
narratives shall sort out “the past to be re-inscribed” from “the past to be
effaced” and incorporate it into an integral story of the nation. From the
perspective of constitutional law as a legal project, it is a matter of legal
principle that has to do the work of sorting them out. As Hahm and Kim
suggest, selective use of the past is a conspicuous attribute of narrative
formations. Narratives selectively (arbitrarily, actually) sketch the plot
of a story to form a vision of the past, whereas the law (re)interprets the
meaning of the past in light of legal principle.
This act of
reinterpretation in light of legal principle is a strategy of law, which
16

Id. at 43–44, 128.
Id. at 44 (quoting Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1049, 1064 (1995)).
18 As for the arrangement of the current Constitution of Japan, it seems to take the notion of
legal principle seriously. It refers to “a universal principle of mankind” in its preamble instead of
national tradition or narrative (see Appendix 2). For the details of the current preamble, see infra Part
III.A.
17
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makes the unmasterable past masterable.
Third, narrative is communal, but the notion of legal principle is
grounded in the universalistic ideals of enlightenment reason. Some
scholars argue that narrative provides legitimacy for the law, or at least
that judges should respect narratives as a form of nomos―a source of
norm for each insular and autonomous community. 19 When this
argument is extended from the law of insular and autonomous
communities to the law of a nation, a narrative provides a legitimate
foundation for constitutional law as well as for the law of communities.
I agree with the idea that legal scholars should pay attention to, and
respect, the norm-generating functions of particular communities, but I
would like to be cautious of expanding this arrangement to constitutional
law.20
Although narrative sometimes gives strength to constitutional law,
the latter should not be replaced with the former. The reason for this
limitation is that communal and inward-looking narratives cannot resolve
conflicts of value. By contrast, if legal principles are of a universalistic
nature,21 then we can rely on legal principles to bring a right answer to
even hard cases.22 Legal principles include individual rights, liberty,
equal treatment under the law, separation of powers, and so on. These
legal principles are based on comprehensive doctrines that reasonable
persons can accept as matters of rational choice. 23
Unlike
narrative-based norms, these principles are incorporated as a mode of
legal norm into the institution of a positive law.
In the next section, I will refer to problems in the LDP draft
constitution, including the proposal to revise important parts of the
current constitution like the preamble, Article 13, and Article 97. We
will see that what they intend to do in this draft clearly demonstrates a
typical case of serious tension between legal principles and national

19
Robert Cover argued that insular and autonomous communities like religious communities
have norm-generating function as interpretive communities and that each of those communities has its
own nomos―narratives, experiences, and visions to which the norm articulated―as basis of its own
law or its own interpretation of what the law truly means. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
20
In other words, norms which autonomous community generates shall not be legal norms.
21
As for what I mean by “universal,” I use this term in this essay not as “global” or
“international” but as “being valid or valuable for every agent.” So “a universal principle” is a
comprehensive doctrine to be applicable, valid, and valuable beyond differences between states, groups,
and individuals.
22
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28 (1977).
23
JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 498 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
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narrative.24
III.

THE LDP DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS

The LDP issued its most recent draft constitution in 2012.25 At
that time, the Democratic Party (DPJ), the largest opposite party to the
LDP, took the administration. As the then-president of the LDP, Mr.
Abe promised voters revision of the Constitution, carrying this new draft
constitution as a flag in the general election in November 2012. The
LDP won the election, and took back the administration from DPJ. On
December 16, 2012, Mr. Abe became the Prime Minister of Japan once
again.26
In 2013, facing the House of Councillors election, the Upper House
of the Diet of Japan, the LDP toned down its call to substantively revise
the Constitution in order to gain more seats so that the LDP would then
have the opportunity to revise the Constitution as it wished. Actually,
PM Abe led the LDP to a landslide victory, but they could not gain the
super majority that would have made it possible for the LDP to propose a
revised draft of the Constitution. In 2015, as mentioned earlier, PM Abe
won the victory in the debate on the National Security Law. With this
background, PM Abe revived the proposal to revise the Constitution and
then focused on incorporating an emergency clause into the current
Constitution. In July 2016, the LDP won another victory in the election
of the House of Councilors. This time the LDP and its companion
parties gained the super majority in both Houses, which may enable them
to launch constitutional revision in the near future.27
24
I have briefly written about this issue. See Keigo Komamura, Kindai tono Ketsubetu,
Monogarai heno Kaiki: Jiminto Kaikenan wa ikanaru imi de Rikkennshugi no kiki nanoka? [Break
Away From Modernity, Return to Narrative: In What Sense the LDP Draft Constitution is Dangerous
for Our Constitutionalism], in KAIKEN NO NANI GA MONDAI KA? [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION?] 31–49 (Yasuhiro Okudaira et al. eds., 2013).
25
Supra note 10.
26
His first administration was September 26, 2006 to September 26, 2007. This administration
lasted only one year because Mr. Abe suddenly resigned due to ulcerative colitis. See Alexander Martin,
Japan’s New Leader Says Recover From Illness, THE WALL STREET Journal (Dec. 16, 2012), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324407504578182794060294914.
27
The Constitution of Japan requires super majority to revise its text. Article 96 of the
Constitution states “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a
concurring vote of two-thirds of all its members, and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon at such
election as the Diet shall specify.” Gaining super majority in the Diet after the victory of the upper
house election in 2016, PM Abe showed an explicit ambition to revise the constitution. See Reiji
Yoshida & Tomohiro Osaki, Election Strengthens LDP as Opposition Flounders; Abe Says Talks to
Begin on Constitutional Revision, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 11, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
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Now I would like to take a look at the LDP draft. In order to
clarify its problematic character, I will emphasize what it deletes from the
current Constitution. The provisions, which this draft removes, should
be considered much more critical than the proposed new provisions
because the deletions from the text erase the essentials of modern
constitutionalism. I argue that for PM Abe to accomplish his political
project and to “Break Away From the Postwar Regime,” he proposes
breaking away from the postwar Constitution also. I will now refer to a
few examples of these problematic deletions.
A.
The Preamble
1.
Potsdam Principles ―― The Constitution of Japan (1946) was
established as an implementation of the Potsdam Declaration (1945) and
based upon the principles which the Declaration required the Japanese
Government to actualize. In the website of its digital exhibition “Birth
of the Constitution of Japan”, the National Diet Library states as follows:
The Constitution of Japan was established through the
confluence of efforts from both outside and inside Japan . . .
The external forces to reform the Constitution of the Empire
of Japan (Meiji Constitution of 1889) manifested themselves
in measures taken under the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, which were necessary to
implement the "Potsdam Declaration" as accepted by Japan
upon its defeat. The internal forces sprang from the
people's desire to realize a true democracy, which would
have been impossible by merely restoring the prewar
parliamentary system after the cessation of hostilities
because the military control of the government during the
war had seriously corrupted the framework of the Meiji
Constitution.28
The Potsdam Declaration was agreed upon and issued on July 26,
1945 by the U.S. President Harry S. Truman, the United Kingdom Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, and Chairman of the Nationalist Government
2016/07/11/national/politics-diplomacy/election-strengthens-ldp-as-opposition-flounders/#.WCFJu8lK
3YY.
28
Preface:
Birth
of
the
Constitution
of
Japan,
NAT’L
DIET
LIBR.
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/00outline.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2016).

86

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 1

of China Chiang Kai-shek, as a call for the surrender of all Japanese
armed forces. The Emperor of Japan accepted the Declaration on
August 14 and announced his acceptance the next day.
While accepting the Declaration, the Japanese Government had
been demanding that the Emperor be permitted to retain his authority and
still remain at the center of the national polity (Kokutai). This means
they wanted to avoid any change to the Imperial Constitution. However,
Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
who had been granted strong powers to take any action necessary to
successfully implement the Potsdam Declaration, issued the "Civil
Liberties Directive" on October 4, 1945, and met with former Prime
Minister Fumimaro Konoye to discuss reforming the Constitution. On
October 11, MacArthur met with Kijuro Shidehara, the newly appointed
Prime Minster, and he proposed the “liberalization of the Constitution.”
From MacArthur’s suggestions, the process of constitutional reform was
launched.29
2.
“A Universal Principle of Mankind” ―― Although the Japanese
Government tried to resist a revision of the Meiji Constitution, the
conditions the Potsdam Declaration (see Appendix 4) requested Japan to
implement made it inevitable for them to bring about fundamental
reforms to the Meiji Constitution because the conditions contained legal
principles such as “a new order of peace, security and justice” (section 6),
“the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies” (section 10),
“[F]reedom of speech, of religion, and of thought” (section 10), “respect
for the fundamental human rights” (section 10), “a peacefully inclined
and responsible government” (section 12).
Those principles became new guidelines for nation-building, which
had never been introduced into, or had long disappeared from, Japan. In
the process of revising the Meiji Constitution, these “Potsdam principles”
were consequently reflected in the preamble and other articles of a new
constitution, the Constitution of Japan.30 Particularly, the preamble is a
29

See generally, RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY (2002).
To some readers, this description here might be a bit confusing. Actually, the process of
making the current Constitution of Japan was not just complicated but also inconsistent. The Potsdam
Declaration requested the government of Japan to make fundamental reforms of its basic structure
because its demand was totally different from the causes and principles on which the Meiji regime was
based. Therefore, this request would have led the government of Japan to establishment of a new
constitution not revision of the Meiji Constitution. However, in order to mitigate poplar shock of
dramatic change of the regime, the government of Japan and SCAP took a strange measure by using
Article 73 (revision clause) of the Meiji Constitution to realize constitutional change which the
30
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depository of the Potsdam principles as a whole. In Appendix 1, you will
find ideas or connotations similar to the Potsdam principles such as “duly
elected representatives,” “sovereign power resides with the people,” “a
sacred trust of the people,” “the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all
nations,” and “the blessings of liberty.”
In sum, the Potsdam
Declaration and the preamble of the current Constitution of Japan deeply
share the great fruits of modern and contemporary thought like
democracy, representative government, popular sovereignty, liberty,
fundamental human rights, and pacifism.
More importantly, we should focus our attention to the last two
passages of the preamble (see Appendix 1) because it demonstrates that
the current Constitution understands its arrangement of these principles as
the statement of “a universal principle of mankind”—that is, not as a
contextual tenet derived solely from Japanese culture or traditions.
Furthermore, the last passage states “[W]e reject and revoke all
constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith”
(emphasis added). In this part of the preamble, the current Constitution
rejects not just laws, ordinances, and rescripts but also all prior and
prospective constitutions in conflict herewith. This means that all laws
that conflict with the universal principles of mankind are rejected. The
current Constitution therefore denies any new constitutions that may
come in the future if these are inconsistent with the essential values of
universal humanism inscribed in the current Constitution.
The current Constitution itself tells about its procedural limitations
on constitutional revision in Article 9631 and its substantial limitations in
the preamble mentioned above. The LDP draft totally deletes these
passages. This means it will get rid of constitutional limitations on the
process and substance of constitutional revision, and that it will thereby
grant current and future political administrations limitless power to revise
the Constitution.

Potsdam Declaration requested. So, in its formality and procedure, the current Constitution of Japan
is a revised version of the Meiji Constitution but, in its substance, it is a new constitution quite different
from the former one. To justify this inconsistency, Japanese constitutional law scholars have relied on
“August Revolution Theory.” For the details of the making process of the current constitution and
“August Revolution Theory,” see Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Nihonkoku Kenpo Seitei no Hori [Legal
Theory of the Birth of Japan’s Constitution] in KENPO NO GENRI (1967); HAHM & KIM, supra note 12,
at 145-147; SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 18-19 (2011).
31
See supra note 28.
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3.
Narrative is Substituted ―― Turning our attention to the LDP
draft preamble (see Appendix 1), it erases the current preamble in its
entirety and replaces it with an alternative passage using wording like,
“its long history and unique culture,” “along with treasuring conformity,”
“formed this nation by families and communities helping each other,”
“our beautiful land,” and “good tradition.”
These are not rational principles, and there are no universal
aspirations to be seen in these concepts. These are terms that only
become comprehensible to the extent that they provide a narrative
reference to the history of Japan. 32 The subject of the first two
paragraphs of the LDP draft preamble is “Our nation,” not “We, the
Japanese people.” This change in literary style set the first two
paragraphs in the narrative-mode of telling the story of our nation.
So the legal principles and universalistic norms are gone and
instead the current LDP draft presents a narrative about Japan’s cultural
uniqueness. To be sure, many legal principles like popular sovereignty,
fundamental rights, and pacifism still remain in the draft. But this new
arrangement places legal principles on the same status with a
mythological narrative (I will discuss the details of this issue in section
4).
Furthermore, we lose words and phrases like “a universal principle
of mankind,” and, “[W]e reject and revoke all constitutions, laws,
ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.” I must emphasize that if
we lose these key provisions, the textual basis for limitations on
constitutional revision will be lost, and thus the normative status of the
Constitution of Japan may be diluted.
4.
Emperor in the Preamble ―― One more thing I think deserves to
be mentioned again is that the term “Emperor” is introduced into the LDP
draft preamble (see Appendix 1). The draft mentions the Emperor and
the imperial institution in this phrase: “a country that has the Emperor, the
32
In fact, the LDP explains at page 5 in the Q&A of the draft why the current preamble needs to
be replaced: “Since some of the articles of the Constitution of Japan are thought to have been provided
based on the Western idea of natural human rights, we, the LDP, consider these articles necessary to be
revised.” Also it says that “we propose our draft constitution in order to make the Constitution of Japan
suitable for our country. The stiff wordings due to translating GHQ draft constitution . . . should be
fully revised.” You can see the Japanese version of the Q&A at the website of the Liberal Democratic
Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquarters. See Nihonkoku Kenpo Kaisei Souan Q&A (Zouho
Ban) [Draft for the Reform of the Constitution of Japan Q&A (Revised edition)], LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
PROMOTION
HEADQUARTERS,
(Oct.
2013),
http://constitution.jimin.jp/faq/.
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symbol of unity of the people, governed based on the separation of powers,
legislation, government, and justice, under popular sovereignty.”
(emphasis added). Actually, the Emperor system is also presented in
main body of the current Constitution in Article 1 and other places.
However, there is no mention of the Emperor in the current preamble.
We should consider the textual arrangement of the LDP draft
preamble that mentions the Emperor. It has been noted that, “[T]he
principle of popular sovereignty was stated in the text of the [current]
Constitution simply as a subordinate clause in Article 1,” whose subject
matter was the Emperor.33 Professor Hahm and Professor Kim, based
upon this textual arrangement, said that, “the exact locus of sovereignty
remains less than fully articulated in the text.”34 In fact, the textual
arrangement is surely an important guide for legal interpretation.
Instead of focusing on the interplay of the text within Article 1, I would
refer to another dimension of the same issue. There is no reference to
the Emperor in the current preamble mentioned above.
It is a common understanding among Japanese constitutional law
experts that the preamble does not have a direct binding power or
function as a judicial norm in the way that the Articles in the main body
of the Constitution do. However, the preamble generally plays a role in
guiding the interpretation of other Articles when there is some leeway in
possible interpretations of the text of the Articles themselves. Thus, the
preamble has an interpretive function. Therefore, we can understand
how to interpret the meaning of the current Article 1—in which the
Emperor system and popular sovereignty coexist in a state of
tension—because the interpretive lens established by the the current
preamble gives us a sense of how to read and resolve this tension. As
mentioned above, there is no reference to the Emperor in the current
preamble, and the Potsdam Declaration makes no reference to the
Emperor either. However, both the current preamble and the Potsdam
Declaration enumerate universal principles such as fundamental human
rights, pacifism, and so on. Given this arrangement, we have textual
grounds to mediate the tension in the current Article 1 between the
Emperor system and popular sovereignty by making use of the universal
33

John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental
Human Rights, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 78 (1990). The full text of Article 1 of the Constitution
of Japan is as follows: “Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the
people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.”
34
HAHM & KIM, supra note 12, at 132.
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principle of reason.35 This is how the text resolves the tension between
the coexistence of popular sovereignty and the Emperor system: it has set
the priority of the universal principles of reason in its preamble, so when
tensions arise, they are to be resolved by the means of legal rationality. I
think that this arrangement in fact presupposes a theoretical or
interpretive superiority of legal principles over the Emperor system.
On the other hand, the LDP draft preamble changes this textual
arrangement and therefore also alters the implied interpretive strategy.
In the LDP draft, the Emperor and narrative-based concepts are
introduced in the proposed preamble, and then these concepts are given
the same priority as legal principles. This new arrangement means that
the interpretive tension between the Emperor system and popular
sovereignty will be deepened as the narrative concepts are moved up
from Article 1 to the preamble itself. If we think the preamble provides
a frame to guide us in our interpretation of the Constitution, then we must
admit that this proposed arrangement introduces a fundamental tension
between law and narrative which disrupts the theoretical or interpretive
superiority of legal principles over the Emperor system.36
To my interpretation and understanding, the preamble of the current
Constitution, and the significance of the Potsdam principles as its
ancestor, have just barely defended the foundation of our constitutional
law over the years. It defends our Constitution from a populist urge to
35

Of course, the Emperor system is based upon the unique culture and history of Japan, and the
Constitution itself recognizes the system in Article 1. But this uniqueness has to be interpreted and
shaped to conform to the legal principles inherent in the interpretive guidance offered by the preamble
and by other related Articles. It is always a difficult task for us to find the optimal balance between
cultural uniqueness and universal reason. That is to say, the task of legal rationality is difficult, to be
sure, but it is not impossible.
36
I would like to discuss a bit more about this issue. As I mentioned in the main body of this
essay, in the current Constitution, the Emperor system first appears in article 1 but is absent from the
preamble. The preamble instead introduces the principle of legal rationality as the foundation of
Japanese law. In this case, even the construction of the Emperor system must be in accordance with the
principles of legal rationality. But how will this situation change if the Emperor system and the
principle of legal rationality are both introduced in the preamble—both given the same level of
priority? If the Emperor system and legal rationality are both introduced in the preamble, then the
architecture of Japanese law will be made to stand on two foundations that will be in a fundamental
tension with each other.
If that happens, then there are two possibilities. First, in order to allow for the coexistence
of both legal rationality and the Emperor system, then some form of optimal balance will have to be
achieved (presumably through the nuancing of the Articles of the draft constitution). The other option
is problematic, but unfortunately, more likely. The two foundations―legal rationality and the
Emperor system―are granted equal legal status. If that happens, the two foundations will be pulling
in two different directions. I am saying that in the LDP draft an irrational myth of national uniqueness
takes on the same legal force as the universal principle of rationality. If so, then there is a likelihood
that the Emperor system will be granted the status of a legal exception, placed beyond the realm of
legal rationality. In other words, the myth of uniqueness will be rendered “sacred” as in placed off
limits to rational interrogation and critique.
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stake the foundation of our legal system not on universalist principles but
rather on narrative or mythology. The LDP draft preamble denies the
independence of law from narrative and thus degenerates the most basic
legal project of this country.
B.

Article 13
Article 13 (see Appendix 2) is another example of a problematic
deletion proposed by the LDP in its draft constitution. The current
Article 13 states that, “[A]ll of the people shall be respected as
individuals.” In a sharp contrast with this, the LDP draft changes this to
“[A]ll of the people shall be respected as persons.”
Replacing “individuals” with “persons” makes a difference.
Needless to say, the concept of personhood includes not just individual
persons but also so-called legal persons, such as corporations, groups
with common ethnicity, or religious groups with common faiths. In the
modern tradition, we set up individual rights against not just state or
government but also against churches, feudal organizations, or many
types of craft guilds. So this seemingly minor change in wording is
another major departure from modern constitutionalism.
C.

Article 97
Article 97 of the current Constitution will be entirely deleted by the
LDP draft (see Appendix 3). The LDP explains in the Q&A that the
Article is a sort of redundancy because the draft uses several terms of
rights in other places so that the draft still serves as a sufficient guarantee
of fundamental human rights. 37 I disagree. I do not think it is a
redundancy.
This Article lies at the head of CHAPTER : SUPREME LAW
and Article 98 follows. The full textual arrangement is cited here:
CHAPTER X.

SUPREME LAW

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this
Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of
the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived
the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon
this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time
37

See supra note 32, at 37.
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inviolate.
Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act
of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions
hereof, shall have legal force or validity.
(2) The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of
nations shall be faithfully observed.
Clearly, Article 98 refers to formal force or validity of the highest
legal norm. It provides that the Constitution is the supreme law and the
highest in the hierarchy of laws of the nation so that the Constitution
holds the power to deny the legal force or validity of subordinate laws in
conflict with it. In Article 98, the Constitution refers to a function of the
supreme law, that is, it states how the supreme law works.
In contrast, Article 97 explains the reason why the Constitution is
supreme. Significantly, it places a legal principle at the core of this
reason. That is, “fundamental human rights by this Constitution
guaranteed,” and “fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free.” So
the idea of the supremacy of fundamental human rights finds its place
here in Article 97, via the preamble, from the Potsdam Declaration.
Undoubtedly, this Article is not a redundancy, but one of the most
important clauses of the Constitution as it tells us the reason why our
Constitution should be the supreme law and it traces a generating process
of the current Constitution of Japan.
Article 97 and 98 articulate the substance and function of the
supreme law. These two taken together clarify the nature of our
Constitution as a legal project. If we lose Article 97 as proposed by the
LDP draft, then we will also lose the universalistic and fundamental
values used to justify the functions that the highest law should hold.
The risk is that without such a foundation, the supreme law and its
functions might be arbitrarily exercised based on the limited set of
narrative-based norms that the LDP draft constitution attempts to
introduce.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In July 10, 2016, the Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition
partners won a two-thirds majority in the House of Councilors, the upper
house of the Diet of Japan, to go along with their two-thirds majority in
the House of Representatives, the lower house. A two-thirds majority is
required in each house to launch the process of revising the Constitution.
PM Abe seemed to be refraining from placing the issue of constitutional
reform on the agenda during the election. However, now that PM Abe
has won the game and gained a super majority in both Houses,
constitutional revision might be reloaded as one of the central issues in
the LDP’s platform.
In this short essay, I have been focusing on the LDP draft
constitution because it is the only draft provided by the ruling parties so
far. As mentioned above, however, as far as the LDP draft constitution
is concerned, it raises a host of thorny issues. One of the most
dangerous qualities of the draft is its clear tendency to dilute the
autonomy of law from narrative. This dilution reduces law to the realm
of politics and inhibits the ability of the former to serve as a check against
the latter. A brief list of some of the fundamental problems with the
LDP draft is daunting: the replacement of the current preamble, the
erasure of “universal principle of mankind” from the text, the
introduction of many narrative-based norms into our Constitution, the
abandoning of our legal principles in favor of the elevation of a
nationalist narrative, and so on.
In closing, I ask: why does the LDP propose a shift to narrative
now? Considering the present state of tension in the Far East, I would
emphasize that inward-looking measures are only heightening the
tensions between the states in eastern Asia. By contrast, a state based
upon a universalistic foundation is qualified to open the channel to
communicate with other states. So as far as Japan maintains the
supremacy of universalistic legal principles as the foundation of our
Constitution, we will be able to critically engage with China, Korea, and
even the United States. In a sharp contrast with such a constitutional
law strategy, however, the LDP draft constitution seems to make our
country more inward-looking, reducing the import of our Constitution to
the realm of nationalist myths based on narratives of cultural uniqueness.
How does this, “every country has its own taste” measure work
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for us? The field of law and its interpretive strategies provide legal
principles as a common ground. These principles are a foundation that
can be open to a particular modus vivendi while also requiring each state
to make the effort to justify their own. As for narrative, however, there
is no other way to engage with it but to accept it or reject it. There is no
ground to stand upon for any negotiation.
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Appendix
―Comparison between the current Constitution (the Constitution of
Japan (1946)) and the proposed constitution (the LDP draft constitution
(2012)).38
―Relevant sections of the Potsdam Declaration (1945).
Appendix 1

THE PREAMBLE

―The Preamble of the current Constitution of Japan (the first
paragraph)
We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives
in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and
our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the
blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again
shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of
government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people
and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of
the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers
of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the
benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle
of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and
revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict
herewith. (emphasis and underline added)
―The Preamble of the LDP draft constitution
Our nation, with its long history and unique culture, is a country that
has the Emperor, the symbol of unity of the people, governed based on the
separation of powers, legislation, government, and justice, under popular
sovereignty.
 Our nation has overcome and developed from the ruins of the Second
World War and a number of catastrophes and now currently holds a
prominent position in the global community, promoting friendlier
relations and contributing to the peace and prosperity of the world
38

Supra note 10. English translations of the Constitution of Japan and the LDP draft
constitution were accessed at the following: The Constitution of Japan, NAT’L DIET LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (Last modified 2003-2004); The Constitutional
Amendment Draft, ASSOCIATION OF YOUNG LAWYERS TO PROTECT TOMORROW OF FREEDOM
(November 1, 2013), http://www.asuno-jiyuu.com/2013/11/blog-post.html.
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through pacifism.
 We, the Japanese people, protect our own country and tradition with
pride and spirit, respect fundamental human rights, along with
treasuring conformity, and formed this nation by families and
communities helping each other.
 We, the people, respect freedom and discipline, protect our beautiful
land and natural environment as we promote education and technology,
and develop the country through economic activities. We, the Japanese
people, in order to transmit good tradition and our nation to posterity for
many years to come, herein, establish this constitution. (emphasis and
underline added)
Appendix 2

ARTICLE 13

―Article 13 of the current Constitution of Japan (excerpted)
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. (emphasis and
underline added).
Article 13 of the LDP draft constitution (excerpted)

All of the people shall be respected as persons.
added)
Appendix 3

(emphasis and underline

ARTICLE 97

―Article 97 of the current Constitution of Japan
The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the
people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of mankind to be free;
they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are
conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time
inviolate.
―Article 97 of the LDP draft constitution
- Deleted –
Appendix 4 THE
POTSDAM
DECLARATION
(PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE
SURRENDER) (issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945)39 (relevant sections
39

2 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NIHON GAIKO NENPYO NARABINI SHUYO BUNSHO:
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only) (emphasis and underline added).
6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking
on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and
justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the
world.
10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.
The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.
Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for
the fundamental human rights shall be established.
12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been
established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese
people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

1840–1945 (1966).
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